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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on the Non-secure Internet 
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) to exchange information freely between 
departments, services, bases, posts, and ships.  The NIPRNET is vulnerable to various 
attacks, to include physical and cyber attacks.  One of the most frequently used cyber 
attacks by criminally motivated hackers is a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.  
DDoS attacks can be used to exhaust network bandwidth and router processing 
capabilities, and as a leveraging tool for extortion.  Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
black hole routing is a responsive defensive network technique for mitigating DDoS 
attacks.  BGP black hole routing directs traffic destined to an Internet address under 
attack to a null address, essentially stopping the DDoS attack by dropping all traffic to the 
targeted system.  
This research examines the ability of BGP black hole routing to effectively defend 
a network like the NIPRNET from a DDoS attack, as well as examining two different 
techniques for triggering BGP black hole routing during a DDoS attack.  This thesis 
presents experiments with three different DDoS attack scenarios to determine the 
effectiveness of BGP black hole routing.  Remote-triggered black hole routing is then 
compared against customer-triggered black hole routing to examine how well each 
technique reacts under a DDoS attack.  The results from this study show BGP black hole 
routing to be highly successful.    It also shows that remote-triggered black hole routing is 
much more effective than customer-triggered. 
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ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF BGP BLACK HOLE ROUTING  
ON A NETWORK LIKE THE NIPRNET 
 
I.  Introduction 
Overview 
 As a result of the current Information Age, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
relies heavily on the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) to 
exchange information freely between departments, services, bases, posts, and ships.  The 
primary mission of the NIPRNET is to provide the capability for all departments and 
services within the DoD to freely exchange information to advance the warfighting 
capabilities of the DoD.       
Although the NIPRNET is composed of hundreds of smaller networks which are 
geographically separated, the NIPRNET must have the capability to transport information 
amongst the smaller networks.  All types of data are exchanged, from voice 
communications and data transfer to real-time video and graphics-intensive distributed 
interactive simulations.  The effectiveness and efficiency of this data communications 
capability will determine in large part the ability of the warfighters to achieve their in-
garrison missions, as well as their war-fighting missions. 
The NIPRNET is vulnerable to various attacks, to include physical and cyber 
attacks.  One of the most frequently used cyber attacks by criminally motivated hackers is 
a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.  DDoS attacks consist of multiple systems 
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on the Internet sending enough IP packets to a system to effectively stop the system from 
serving information to legitimate users.  DDoS attacks can be used to exhaust network 
bandwidth and router processing capabilities, and as a leveraging tool for extortion.  
DDoS attacks are fast becoming a major problem to information assurance.  Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) black hole routing is a defensive network technique for 
mitigating DDoS attacks.  BGP black hole routing directs traffic destined to an Internet 
address under attack to a null address, essentially stopping the DDoS attack from 
affecting the entire network by dropping all traffic to the targeted system.     
Research Goal 
Due the vulnerability of the NIPRNET, the DoD is researching various ways to 
defend it.  Consequently, AFIT has been tasked by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
to assist in this process by using modeling and simulation to evaluate the effectiveness of 
BGP black hole routing to defend the NIPRNET from DDoS attacks.  The goal of this 
research is to investigate the capabilities of BGP black hole routing in protecting a 
network like the NIPRNET from a DDoS attack.  In addition, this research investigates 
two approaches to trigger the BGP black hole routing to determine if one is more 
efficient than the other.   
Results Overview 
The results of this research proved that BGP black hole routing is effective in 
defending a network like the NIPRNET from DDoS attacks.  This finding alone should 
assist the DoD community in drafting up defense policies of the NIPRNET against DDoS 
attacks.  Another contribution this research should provide is that it demonstrated 
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customer-triggered BGP black hole routing isn’t as reliable and efficient as remote-
triggered BGP black hole routing.  Finally, this research demonstrated that BGP black 
hole routing is more efficient and is a better defense mechanism when all of the border 
routers are configured to drop attack traffic. 
Summary 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents a 
literature review of DDoS attacks and techniques, to include BGP black hole routing, on 
how to defend networks.  Chapter 3 lays out a network performance analysis 
methodology, which is used to define the problem at hand, describe the approach of this 
research, define the system, and explain the experimental design.  Chapter 4 details the 
analysis portions of this process by evaluating the simulated network’s outputs, which are 
used in the decision making process to arrive a recommended solution.  Chapter 5 
concludes this report by summarizing the results and providing recommendations for 
follow-on work to this research. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter gives the necessary theoretical background required to devise an 
effective Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack defense methodology using Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) Black Hole Routing techniques.  To do this, the first Section 
begins with background information on the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router 
Network (NIPRNET).  The next Section breaks down the different techniques used to 
conduct DDoS attacks.  Then the third Section describes different defense techniques 
used against DDoS attacks.  The characteristics of Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), 
Routing Information Protocol (RIP), and BGP protocols are discussed in the fourth 
Section.  The technology of BGP Black Hole Routing is covered in Section 5.  Section 6 
compares BGP Black Hole Routing against other techniques for defending against DDoS 
attacks.  Options for implementing BGP Black Hole Routing are presented in the next to 
last Section, followed by a summary of the chapter in the final Section.  
NIPRNET Configuration 
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is the owner of the NIPRNET.  
The NIPRNET is a virtual network that is made up of a large compilation of smaller 
networks throughout the world.  Every DoD network comprises the NIPRNET.    DISA 
maintains border routers that connect the NIPRNET to the internet.  Each DoD network 
connects to one of the DISA border routers to enable users to access the internet and each 
other.  The DISA border routers are connected to each other via a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN).  Data exchanged between two DoD networks on the NIPRNET travels 
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from one border router to another via internet communication channels.  A diagram to 
illustrate how two Air Force bases are connected to the NIPRNET is shown in Figure 1 
below. 
 
Figure 1 – Example of Two Bases on the NIPRNET 
As shown in Figure 1, if Base A wants to send something to Base B the information will 
travel from Base A to the border router on a dedicated communication line.  Once the 
data is received by the border router, it will transmit the data via a communication line 
attached to the Internet.  The data will flow through the Internet until it reaches the border 
router that Base B is connected to.  The Base B border router will then forward the data 
to Base B on another dedicated communication line.  This illustrates how the NIPRNET 
is a virtual network and it relies on communication channels on the Internet to transport 
data from one network to the next. 
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Distributed Denial of Service Attacks  
The goal of a DDoS attack is to inflict damage on the victim, either for personal 
reasons, for material gain, for popularity, or for political reasons [MMR00].  DDoS 
attacks have to incorporate hundreds, thousands, or millions of compromised systems to 
be effective.  An attacker will break into these systems to install DDoS software on them 
[BEN00].  The attacker will then use these compromised systems to attack innocent 
victims on the internet.  These attacks take advantage of limited resources of the victim to 
exhaust such things as bandwidth, router processing capacity, or network stack resources 
[BEN00].  The result of such attacks is a victim that can no longer provide a service to its 
customers.  This section will address the following questions:   
1. What makes DDoS attacks possible?  
2. How do these attacks occur?  
3. Why do they occur? 
DDoS Attack Strategy. 
In order to perform a distributed denial-of-service attack, the attacker needs to 
recruit the multiple agent machines.  This is usually done automatically through scanning 
of remote machines, looking for security holes.  Vulnerable machines are then exploited 
and become part of the DDoS network.  These agent machines are then used to carry out 
the attack against the victim.  Attackers usually hide the identity of the agents during an 
attack through spoofing of the source address field in packets.  This technique allows the 
attacker to use the agents for a future attack.   
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Classification by Degree of Automation. 
During the attack preparation, the attacker has to locate different agents and infect 
them with the attack code.  To accomplish this, the attacker has three different modes of 
automation which are:  1) Manual, 2) Semi-automatic, and 3) Automatic [MMR00].  
These three modes will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Manual Attacks. 
Only in the early days of DDoS attacks were manual techniques used.  These 
techniques consisted of the attacker breaking into the different machines and loading the 
attack code.  The attacker would then have to manually control each of the agents from 
his/her own workstation.  This technique led the attackers to find faster techniques that 
led to semi-automatic techniques. 
Semi-Automatic Attacks. 
In semi-automatic attacks, the DDoS network consists of handler (master) and 
agent (slave) machines [MMR00]. The attacker deploys automated scripts for scanning 
and compromise of those machines and installation of the attack code.  The attacker then 
uses the handler systems to specify the attack type and the victim’s address and to 
command the onset of the attack.  The attacker can choose to set up the DDoS network 
with either direct communication or indirect communication.  With direct 
communication, the handlers and slave machines must know each other’s identity to 
communicate.  With indirect communication, the attacker uses a service already on the 
Internet, such as internet relay chat (IRC), and controls the slaves via IRC channels.  This 
technique makes it hard to distinguish between legitimate traffic and DDoS traffic.  The 
use of the service in this case replaces the need for handlers. 
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Automatic Attacks. 
Automatic attacks further automate the attack by programming the time of the 
attack, attack type, duration, and victim’s address into the attack code [MMR00].  This 
form of attack allows the attacker to have minimal exposure since he/she only has to 
issue a single command – the start of the attack command.   
Classification by Exploited Vulnerability. 
Attackers will use different techniques to conduct DDoS attacks to deny clients 
access to the victim.  Two classes are protocol attacks and brute-force attacks. 
Protocol Attacks. 
Protocol attacks exploit a bug of some protocol installed on the victim in order to 
carry out the attack [MMR00].  An example of a protocol attack would be a SYN flood.  
In this type of attack an attacker would repeatedly send SYN packets to the victim 
without completing the three-way TCP handshake.  The victim’s queue would eventually 
fill up waiting for the ACK response from the attacking machines.  Thus the victim 
would not have sufficient processing power to service legitimate traffic requests. 
Brute-force Attacks. 
Brute-force attacks are carried out by generating a large amount of traffic 
[MMR00].  The attacker uses the fact that certain services are necessary for a victim and 
he/she uses this knowledge by crafting what seems to be legitimate traffic.  The upstream 
providers can handle the amount of traffic generated by the attacker, but the victim 
service has a smaller processing queue, thus a resulting DDoS attack.  There are some 
brute-force attacks that can be filtered at the victim such as ICMP attacks and UDP flood 
attacks.  Other brute-force attacks cannot be filtered and thus the victim is defenseless 
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against, such as generating a vast amount of HTTP requests to a web server on the 
victim’s network.  Brute-force attacks do need to generate a greater amount of traffic to 
have the same results as protocol attacks. 
Classification by Attack Rate Dynamics. 
DDoS attacks can be differentiated between continuous rate attacks and variable 
rate attacks [MMR00].  The majority of known attacks deploy a continuous rate 
mechanism [MMR00].  This technique is carried out by having the agents generate 
packets at full force after the attack command is given.  The continuous rate attacks are 
much easier to detect and defend against, since the victim can see the continuous 
onslaught of traffic coming in.  Variable rate attacks can be further broken down into 
increasing rate attacks and fluctuating rate attacks [MMR00].  Increasing rate attacks start 
with a low amount of attack packets and gradually increase the number of packets.  This 
technique will lead to a slow degradation of the victim’s service, but it does delay the 
detection of the attack.  Fluctuating rate attacks adjust the rate of attack packets 
depending on the victim’s behavior [MMR00].  A form of fluctuating rate attack is 
pulsing attacks [MMR00].  This is where the attacker will cease sending attack packets, 
thus the victim will only experience periodic service disruptions. 
Classification by Impact. 
DDoS attacks can further be classified by the impact they have on the victim.  The 
two different categories are disruptive and degrading [MMR00].  Disruptive attacks strive 
to shut down the victim’s service entirely [MMR00].  Currently, all known attacks belong 
to this category [MMR00].  Degrading attacks attempt to only consume a portion of the 
victim’s resources [MMR00].  Degrading attacks can have a much greater impact on 
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victims than disruptive attacks.  Degrading attacks could lose the victim customers or 
even worse have the victim spend more money to upgrade the resources to which the 
attacker would then just increase the amount of traffic sent to the victim to degrade the 
victim’s service.  The victim would never be able to spend enough money to produce a 
customer friendly environment as long as the attacker went unnoticed.   
DDoS Defense Techniques 
DDoS Defense Techniques are broken down into three main categories which are:  
prevention, detection, and response [SEC03].  The goal of a well organized network is to 
have a good prevention scheme in place to prevent DDoS attacks from occurring in the 
first place.  If a DDoS attack does slip by the preventive measures in place then the 
network administrators need to be able to detect the DDoS attack.  Finally, the part of 
most well thought out networks that is lacking in today’s network oriented world is the 
response plan for stopping a DDoS attack after it has been successfully launched.  The 
following three sections will discuss some of the techniques used in each of these three 
areas. 
Prevention. 
Prevention is the first step to ensure a network will not be affected by a DDoS 
attack.  The first form of prevention would be ingress filtering.  Ingress filtering is 
accomplished by the network routers and would prevent spoofed packets with the same 
address as the intranet or packets with invalid addresses from entering the network 
[SEC03].  A clever hacker would use known good addresses to spoof the routers and thus 
bypass the ingress filtering.  Egress filtering, on the other hand, would prevent any 
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outgoing packets with a source address out of the range of the intranet from leaving the 
network, thus preventing the systems on the network from participating in a DDoS attack 
against another network [SEC03].  A good hacker would use valid intranet addresses to 
send the attack traffic from, thus bypassing the egress filtering.  Another form of 
prevention is to ensure protocol security mechanisms are in place.  Examples of protocol 
security mechanisms include guidelines for a safe protocol design in which resources are 
committed to the client only after sufficient authentication is done, or the client has paid a 
sufficient price, deployment of a powerful proxy server that completes TCP connections, 
TCP SYN cookies, etc.  Prevention techniques are a good start to defending against 
DDoS attacks, but since they can be bypassed, there is still a need for detection. 
Detection. 
Detection is the phase where either an analyst or a computer system on the 
network detects something strange about the traffic.  One approach is by pattern detection 
[SEC03].  Using pattern detection, an analyst or computer system can detect most 
common DDoS attacks, since they usually possess some sort of signature.  Another 
avenue of detection is through the use of anomaly detection [SEC03].  Anomaly detection 
takes advantage of the fact that most networks have a normal day-to-day network load.  
Anomaly detection uses this fact and if it notices an unusual load on the network it will 
raise a red flag.  Anomaly detection can be conducted by analysts monitoring their 
network, or in most cases it is conducted by a system on the network that compares 
current traffic patterns with a graph of the normal traffic on the network.  An advantage 
of anomaly detection over pattern detection is that anomaly detection has the possibility 
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of detecting new attacks with no known patterns.  A disadvantage of anomaly detection is 
it could lead to false positives due to an increase in normal network traffic.  Now that the 
DDoS attack has been detected the final thing that needs to be accomplished is 
responding to it. 
Response. 
Response is the final action needed to be taken after a DDoS attack has been 
launched.  The main goal of a DDoS attack response is to minimize the impact on the 
victim while imposing minimal collateral damage to valid customers.  There are four 
general response techniques that can be used in response to an ongoing DDoS attack.  
The first response technique is called traceback.  Traceback determines the addresses 
(somewhat accurately) of the attackers and informs the victim of their identities 
[ZAR03].  The victim could then use such things as IP filtering or a personal firewall to 
prevent packets from the attacking systems from communicating with it.  A second 
response technique involves rate limiting [ZAR03].  Routers on the network could be 
configured to limit the rate of traffic from addresses sending malicious-appearing 
packets.  The flaw with rate limiting is that it will still allow some attack traffic through 
and thus a high-scale attack could still prove successful.  Filtering is a third response 
technique.  Filtering is conducted with network firewalls or routers by configuring them 
to deny any traffic on the network from the attacking addresses.  A flaw with this 
technique is the attackers could be using spoofed addresses of valid customers, thus valid 
customers could be denied access to resources.  A final strategy would involve the 
reconfiguration of the network.  The network could be designed to have a system that 
serves no purpose but to capture attack packets.  Once the attack started, the dedicated 
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victim system could be configured with the actual victim’s address and the victim would 
be assigned a new address.  This would involve updating Domain Name Service (DNS) 
tables and ensuring the update was propagated throughout the internet.    
Routing Protocols 
The Internet is split into Autonomous Systems (ASes).  These ASes correspond to 
such things as companies, universities, military departments, backbones, etc.  Each AS is 
given a unique 16-bit number (ASN) to differentiate it from other ASes [KAL00].  The 
administrator from each AS then uses an Internal Gateway Protocol (IGP) to configure 
each of the routers in his or her domain.  Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), Routing 
Information Protocol (RIP), and internal Border Gateway Protocol (iBGP) are examples 
of IGPs.  External Gateway Protocol (EGP) is used to distribute routing information 
between ASes.  External Border Gateway Protocol (eBGP-4) is the most prevalent EGP 
used on the Internet today [UCD03].  This section will discuss the three IGPs listed above 
since BGP Black Hole Routing uses iBGP within an AS.  The focus of this section will 
be to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the three IGPs, as well as the 
differences between the three.  The first protocol to be discussed will be OSPF. 
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF). 
OSPF functions just as its name suggests.  This protocol will use the shortest path 
between two nodes whenever possible.  OSPF is a link-state protocol.  The link is an 
interface on the router while the state is the description of the link as well as the 
relationship of that link with its neighbors [CIS96].  The link state algorithm used by 
OSPF begins with either an initialization or a change in the routing information of a 
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particular router.  The router will generate a link-state advertisement to include all of the 
link-states associated with it.  The other routers on the network will then exchange link-
states by means of flooding [CIS96].  Each router that receives a link-state update will 
store it in its database and then forward the update on.  Upon update of every router 
database, the initiating router will calculate the shortest path tree to all destinations using 
Dijkstra’s algorithm.  Upon completion, the router will now have a new IP routing table.  
OSPF only generates network traffic when an update to the network is made, thus 
reducing the amount of traffic on the network.  Some of the advantages of OSPF include:  
no hop count limitation, allows for better load balancing than RIP, allows for router 
authentication by using different methods of password authentication, only sends updates 
when necessary to better utilize available bandwidth, and finally it allows for the transfer 
and tagging of external routes loaded into the AS [CIS96].   
Routing Information Protocol (RIP). 
RIP uses algorithms that use distance vectors to mathematically compare routes to 
determine the best path to any given address.  RIP uses a single routing metric (hop 
count) to determine the distance between the source and destination networks.  RIP 
routers will only store the best route (the route with the fewest hops) to a destination.  
RIP sends routing-update messages at regular intervals and when the network topology 
changes [DAT04]. A router will update its routing table when it receives a routing update 
with changes.  The metric value for the path is increased by one, and the sender is 
indicated as the next hop [DAT04]. After updating its routing table, the router 
immediately begins transmitting routing updates to inform other network routers of the 
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change. These updates are sent as soon as changes are made with no regard to when the 
next scheduled update is due to take place.  RIP also prevents routing loops by limiting 
the number of hop counts in any source to destination path to 15 [CIS96].  RIP routers 
will classify a network as unreachable if a routing update causes the metric associated 
with that network to reach 16.  A negative to this approach is that RIP networks are 
limited to 15 hops between any given source and destination.  RIP uses timers to regulate 
its performance.  The routing-update timer keeps track of the time between periodic 
routing updates, which is usually a 30 second window.  A route-timeout timer is used to 
mark routes as invalid when the timer expires without receiving any updates from that 
route within the timeout window.  The route will be retained in the router’s routing table 
until the route-flusher timer expires at which time the invalid routes will be removed.  
Some of the advantages of RIP include:  limiting of hops virtually eliminates loops, 
timers ensure only valid routes are maintained in the routing tables, as well as 
mechanisms that prevent incorrect routing information from propagating throughout the 
network. 
Internal Border Gateway Protocol (iBGP). 
BGP-enabled routers within the same AS use iBGP when communicating with 
one another.  The core router is the only router that uses eBGP to publish updates to its 
neighbors of other ASes.  eBGP is the most prevalent used EGP on the Internet.  For the 
remainder of this section, BGP represents both iBGP and eBGP.  BGP is a very robust 
and scalable routing protocol.  BGP uses many routing parameters, or attributes, to 
maintain a stable routing environment.  The weight attribute is local to the router and is 
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never advertised to the community [CIS03].  When a BGP router receives multiple paths 
to the same network, it assigns weight values to each of the paths, and the one with the 
highest weight is loaded into its routing table.  Figure 2 demonstrates this process.     
 
Figure 2 - BGP Weight Attribute [CIS03] 
The local preference attribute is used to determine the exit point from one AS to another 
AS.  When multiple routers on the local AS receive advertisements to another AS, they 
each assign a local preference value and the one with the highest value is then designated 
as the exit point to send traffic from the local AS to the advertised AS [CIS03].  Figure 3 
illustrates this. 
 
Figure 3 - BGP Local Preference Attribute [CIS03] 
The origin attribute indicates how BGP learned of a particular route.  The three possible 
values of the origin attribute are IGP, EGP, and Incomplete [CIS03].  An origin attribute 
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of IGP indicates the route was learned via the internal AS, whereas EGP indicates the 
route was learned from an external AS.  Incomplete states the origin of the route is 
unknown or was learned via other means.  The community attribute provides a way of 
grouping destinations, to which routing decisions can be applied.  A community attribute 
of no-export states not to advertise the route to eBGP peers.  This attribute is used with 
Black Hole Routing.  A community attribute of no-advertise states not to advertise the 
route to any peers and an internet community attribute states to advertise the route to the 
internet community.  BGP uses these attributes to determine which paths to put in its 
routing table.  The first decision BGP makes with an update is if it specifies a path that is 
inaccessible, then it will be dropped.  If the update is good then BGP loads the path with 
the greatest weight.  In the case of identical weights, BGP will then prefer the path with 
the largest local preference.  When the local preferences are the same, BGP will prefer 
the path generated by BGP running on the local router.  If no route was originated, then 
BGP will prefer the path with the shortest AS_path.  In the case of all AS_path lengths 
being equal, BGP will prefer the path with the lowest origin type beginning with IGP as 
the lowest.  If all attributes are equal, BGP will prefer the path with the lowest IP address.  
Figure 4 summarizes the decisions made by BGP for path selections. 
 
Figure 4 BGP Path Selection [CIS03] 
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BGP Black Hole Routing 
BGP black hole routing is a responsive filtering technique used to defend against 
active DDoS attacks.  This technique uses the router’s ability to route unwanted traffic to 
a Null0 interface (black hole) [CIS04].  Black hole routing takes advantage of iBGP to 
stop unwanted traffic from reaching the victim. 
Black Hole Routing as a Filter. 
It is common practice to use the Null0 interface to filter packets to a 
predetermined destination [GRE02].  The creation of static host routes pointing to the 
Null0 pseudo interface is how black hole routing is accomplished [GRE02].  The Null0 is 
a pseudo-interface that is always up and can never forward or receive traffic, much like 
the host address of 127.0.0.1 on personal computers.  The Null0 interface is not a valid 
interface within the Forwarding Information Base (FIB) [GRE02].  Since Null0 is not a 
valid interface, packets forwarded to Null0 will be dropped by the FIB.  An example of 
how to set up the interface to black hole traffic destined to a certain address is shown 
below. 
   interface Null0 
no icmp unreachables 
    
   ip route 171.68.10.1 255.255.255.255 null 0 [GRE02] 
 
The “no icmp unreachables” command is used to prevent the router from becoming 
overloaded with numerous ICMP unreachable replies.  Black hole routing relies on the 
strength of the router’s forwarding performance to drop the black listed packets.  Black 
hole filtering can be configured to either drop packets based on the destination address or 
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the source address.  Figure 5 below shows how the Black hole filtering technique is 
executed. 
 
Figure 5 – Using Static Routes for Black Hole Routing [GRE02] 
Remote-Triggered Black Hole Routing. 
Remote-triggered black hole routing relies on the strength of the routers to route 
unwanted packets to the Null0 interface at the border routers.  The routing update that is 
sent by a trigger router via iBGP activates a pre-configured static route on all of the 
border routers that filters traffic to a particular address.  Figure 6 below demonstrates 
how this remote-triggered black hole routing is accomplished. 
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Figure 6 – Remote-Triggered Black Hole Routing Scheme [GRE02] 
Setting up a iBGP Black Hole Routing Enabled Network by Utilizing the 
Destination Address. 
There are four steps that need to be considered when setting up a network to use 
iBGP Black Hole Routing as a defensive mechanism against DDoS attacks.  The first 
step is to set up a static route to the Null0 interface on all of the routers you want to 
participate.  Included in this step is the allocation of a block of address space that is not 
used on the internet, for example the 192.0.2.0/24 network space [MOR04].  The second 
step is to set up the trigger router.  The trigger router should be included in the iBGP 
network with the other routers [MOR04].  The trigger router doesn’t have to be a router 
at all, it could be a workstation with tools such as Zebra/GateD installed on it [MOR04].  
Figure 7 below demonstrates how the trigger router is set up to redistribute static routes. 
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Figure 7 – Trigger Router Set-up [MOR04] 
This example matches a static route of 66 and sets the next hop to 192.0.2.1.  It sets the 
local-preference to 50 to override the original advertised route and finally, it sets the 
community no-export to prevent the route from being advertised outside of the network 
that this router is on.  The third step is activation.  In the activation phase a static route for 
the address under attack will be put into the trigger router with a tag of 66.  The trigger 
router will then advertise this to the other routers in the network, who will see that it has a 
local-preference of 50 and will put it in the FIB.  From this point, all traffic destined to 
the address under attack will be sent to the Null0 interface.  Figure 8 below demonstrates 
this process. 
 
Figure 8 – BGP Activation [GRE02] 
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The final step involves the removal of the static route from all of the routers.  The trigger 
router will send out an iBGP withdrawal to all of the routers, that will remove the static 
route from the FIB and thus traffic will then start flowing normally back to the address 
that was under attack [GRE02]. 
Limitations of Destination Address iBGP Black Hole Routing. 
Black hole routing takes place at the network layer of the TCP/IP model [CIS04].  
Thus, it is not possible to use this technique to filter TCP protocols such as HTTP, Telnet, 
etc.  To accomplish this form of filtering, you would have to use a firewall or equivalent.  
Black hole routing is an all-or-nothing technique for stopping unwanted traffic.  Another 
limitation of black hole routing is it is hard to by-pass or provide exceptions to the 
filtering.  If you wanted legitimate traffic to get to the address under attack you would 
have to find some way to by-pass the FIB, which isn’t a trivial process, or to conduct 
source-based filtering, which isn’t a great option.  Finally, routers used to conduct black 
hole routing and their associated links have to be robust enough to stand up against a 
rigorous DDoS attack [RAJ02]. 
BGP Black Hole Routing versus Other Techniques 
In reality, there is no known defense technique that will stop all DDoS attacks.  
This section demonstrates how BGP black hole routing, as a responsive technique, differs 
from other preventive, responsive, and detection techniques. 
BGP Black Hole Routing. 
BGP black hole routing takes advantage of stopping the attack traffic at the 
perimeter of the network.  It uses all of the perimeter routers as a defense mechanism.  By 
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stopping the DDoS traffic at the exterior, the BGP black hole routing network is 
protected from loss of bandwidth within the internal network.  By using other tools, such 
as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), BGP black hole routing can be automated to 
activate the trigger router to send out the iBGP announcements of the static routes to use.  
This alleviates human intervention during an actual DDoS attack.  BGP black hole 
routing isn’t without weaknesses, though.  By using destination-based BGP black hole 
routing the network is dropping all packets destined for the victim machine that might 
include some legitimate traffic.  This is one aspect of BGP black hole routing that 
network administrators will have to consider before deciding on using BGP black hole 
routing.  Another advantage of black hole routing is it takes advantage of equipment that 
is already on the network.  By using the routers that are already in place it saves money 
and time by not requiring additional equipment, money, and set-up time to defend against 
DDoS attacks.  BGP black hole routing isn’t the Holy Grail when it comes to DDoS 
defense and that is why this section will address some other defense techniques. 
Firewalls. 
Another responsive DDoS defense technique commonly used is firewalls.  
Firewalls are designed to deny any unwanted traffic from entering the network.  Firewalls 
are in-line systems, which mean they are potentially a single point of failure if they quit 
working.  This leads to the first disadvantage of firewalls, in that they are susceptible to 
DDoS attacks themselves [RIV04].  If a firewall isn’t robust enough to handle a large 
DDoS attack then the firewall system could fail, thus accomplishing the goal of a DDoS 
attack by taking the entire network off-line.  A second disadvantage of firewalls is they 
can not detect spoofed IP addresses [RIV04].  Once a DDoS attack starts using spoofed 
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IP addresses, firewalls are useless against defending the network.  An advantage of using 
firewalls is that they operate at layer 4 of the OSI model.  Firewalls can effectively block 
traffic destined for specific TCP protocols, such as HTTP, DNS, and SMTP.  On the 
other hand, if an attack was focused at a public web server that the firewall had to allow 
traffic to, then the firewall would be rendered useless against such an attack due to 
firewalls’ inabilities to detect anomalous traffic [RIV04].  Firewalls can shut down flows 
associated with DDoS attacks, which is another advantage of using firewalls as a DDoS 
defense mechanism.  This flow shut down can only occur when the IP addresses remain 
constant.   
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). 
IDS solutions are a detection technique used to defend against DDoS attacks.  An 
IDS solution could provide behavioral or anomaly-based algorithms to detect a DDoS 
attack.  The only limitation is that IDS solutions only detect DDoS attacks and they have 
no capability to mitigate such an attack [RIV04].  This is the reason that the use of an 
IDS solution would have to be combined with another DDoS defense mechanism capable 
of mitigating an attack.  IDS solutions have emerged through the years as a prime 
candidate to detect DDoS attacks.  A weakness of IDS solutions is they are only as useful 
as the people who have designed the algorithms.  IDS solutions have to constantly be 
tweaked by experts to stay current with the latest DDoS attack signatures [RIV04].  IDS 
solutions also rely on storing information in a database for analysts to look at network 
traffic patterns.  A DDoS attack could take advantage of this and send enough traffic to 
actually crash the IDS by filling up the database and rendering the IDS useless for 
detecting future attacks.   
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Over-provisioning. 
A prevention strategy in defending against DDoS attacks is to buy excess 
bandwidth or network devices to withstand such attacks [RIV04].  This strategy has a 
weakness in that, no matter how much bandwidth is available or how much redundant 
equipment is available, an attacker just needs to increase the amount of attack traffic to 
achieve a successful attack.  This strategy is not cost-effective either.  Most companies, to 
include the Department of Defense (DoD), don’t have the money to invest in excessive 
bandwidth and network devices just to defend against DDoS attacks. 
Review. 
As you can see from this section, there is no silver bullet for defending against 
DDoS attacks.  BGP black hole routing definitely seems to be the most capable, but it is 
not without its weaknesses.  To make better use of black hole routing, it stands to reason 
that combining it with an IDS solution would increase a network’s defense posture 
against DDoS attacks.  There are other defense techniques, but this section highlighted 
the most common techniques used in networks today. 
BGP Black Hole Routing Implementations 
This section will address black hole routing implementations.  Remote- and 
Customer-triggered black hole routing refers to ways to implement the dropping of 
packets.  Source-based black hole routing refers to what packets should be dropped.  
Source-based black hole routing is addressed here due to the fact the remainder of this 
research will be using destination-based black hole routing.  Destination-based black hole 
routing is a safer choice to use, since it is dropping all traffic to a known internal address 
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and the only affect is that one internal server is not able to serve its customers.  Source-
based black hole routing is dropping traffic based on an outside source address range.  
Therefore, there is a potential that customers are not able to conduct business with more 
than just one internal server if their addresses are within the source address range being 
dropped by the border routers.      
Remote-Triggered Black Hole Routing. 
Remote-triggered black hole routing is the dominant implementation in use today.  
Remote-triggered black hole routing is controlled by the Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
and in the case of the NIPRNET the ISP would be DISA.  Remote-triggered black hole 
routing was thoroughly explained previously in this chapter. 
Customer-Triggered Black Hole Routing. 
Customer-triggered black hole routing is controlled by the customer of the ISP.  
In the case of the NIPRNET, the customer would be the base under attack.  Customer-
triggered black hole routing takes advantage of the fact that the customer’s router speaks 
BGP to the border routers.  If the customer notices his or her network is getting 
overloaded with a DDoS attack, he or she can send a BGP update to the border routers 
through his or her local router to have the incoming traffic dropped.  As with remote-
triggered black hole routing, the border routers would have to be configured to accept and 
apply the updates from the customer’s router.  The commercial ISPs do not like to allow 
customers to update their border routers due to the chance of sending bogus updates that 
would affect more than just the customer under attack.  That is the reason that customer- 
triggered black hole routing is not widely used in the internet. 
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Source-Based Black Hole Routing. 
This research is conducted to test the effects of black hole routing using the 
destination address of the attack traffic.  Another form of black hole routing is to drop 
traffic based on the source address.  Source based black hole routing incorporates Cisco's 
unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) check. uRPF checks the source address of 
incoming packets against the routing table to determine whether the interface the packet 
arrived on is the next hop interface for the source address. Packets are dropped if they 
arrive on an interface the router wouldn’t use to reach the source address. This technique 
works well for interfaces connected to customer networks and it can work for peers, but it 
isn’t very useful on transit links.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theoretical background necessary to devise an 
effective Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack defense methodology using Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) Black Hole Routing techniques.  It began with an overview of 
the NIPRNET, followed by a description of the different DDoS attacks.  Next, a brief 
review of the different defense techniques used against DDoS attacks was presented.  The 
characteristics of the three major routing protocols were addressed, followed by an in 
depth review of how BGP black hole routing is currently used to defend against DDoS 
attacks.  BGP black hole routing was compared against other techniques for defense 
against DDoS attacks.  Finally, an explanation of BGP Black Hole Routing options to 
defend against DDoS attacks was addressed. 
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III. Methodology 
 
 
Problem Definition 
Scope of Problem. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) must have the capability to defend against 
DDoS attacks to protect information systems.  BGP black hole routing has been used 
successfully in the civilian sector, but certain aspects of it have not been studied to 
determine the feasibility of using it as a defensive mechanism against DDoS attacks.  
This research determines the feasibility of using BGP black hole routing to defend 
against DDoS attacks targeting NIPRNET systems. 
Goals. 
This research had five goals which were: 
1.  Determine if BGP black hole routing has any adverse effects on the 
normal operations of a network like the NIPRNET. 
2.  Determine if BGP black hole routing is effective in defending a 
network like the NIPRNET against a DDoS attack. 
3.  Determine the effectiveness of BGP black hole routing when one or 
more border routers are not dropping attack traffic. 
4.  Determine the feasibility of remote-triggered BGP black hole routing 
on a network like the NIPRNET during a DDoS attack. 
5.  Determine whether customer-triggered BGP black hole routing is as 
effective as remote-triggered BGP black hole routing.   
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A hypothesis of goal one was that BGP black hole routing would not affect Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) traffic between nodes within a NIPRNET, but it would prevent 
the delivery of any Internet traffic to the system under the DDoS attack.  As for the 
second goal, BGP black hole routing has been effective in the civilian sector, so it was 
expected to be successful in a NIPRNET as well.  In regards to the third goal, it stood to 
reason that if one or more of the border routers continued passing DDoS traffic to the 
target system, then a sophisticated DDoS attack could still be successful by sending a 
majority of the attack packets through those routers.  A hypothesis of the fourth goal was 
that it should take longer to successfully trigger black hole routing when the DDoS attack 
uses more attack packets.  Finally, customer-triggered BGP black hole routing shouldn’t 
be as effective as remote-triggered black hole routing due to the fact that the base routers 
communicate with the border routers on communication channels with smaller bandwidth 
capabilities.      
Approach. 
To achieve the first goal, the approach was to compare bandwidth utilization, 
latency, and border router queuing delay in the NIPRNET during an attack to the same 
data prior to the attack.  If the data between the two was the same, then it was determined 
that BGP black hole routing does not have any adverse affects on the normal operations 
of the NIPRNET.  The approach to achieve the second goal used the same data as the first 
goal.  If the attack traffic was successfully dropped and there were no adverse affects on 
normal operation of the NIPRNET, then it was determined that BGP black hole routing 
successfully defended against DDoS attacks.  The third goal was achieved by comparing 
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the bandwidth utilization, inbound latency of the bases under attack, and the queuing 
delay of the border routers connected to the bases under attack.  For this goal, there were 
three different scenarios of data to compare against the baseline data.  If the data was the 
same then it was determined that BGP black hole routing was effective in defending a 
network with less than all of the border routers actively participating in black hole 
routing.  The approach to achieve the fourth goal was to measure the router convergence 
delay.  This test measured the amount of time it took each of the border routers to receive 
the update packet from the trigger router and to start blocking the DDoS attack traffic.  
To achieve the fifth goal, the approach was to compare the router convergence delay data 
between remote0triggered simulations and customer-triggered simulations.  If the border 
routers received the updates and started blocking the DDoS attack traffic in the same 
amount of time, it was determined that customer-triggered black hole routing is as 
effective as remote-triggered black hole routing.  
Evaluation Technique 
The evaluation technique used in this research was simulation.  The simulation 
software package used was Opnet Modeler version 10.5.  Empirical data was obtained so 
simulation can test the hypotheses.  The model used in this simulation can also be used in 
future studies of BGP black hole routing.  Due to the complexity of setting up a large 
network and the cost that would have been incurred, direct measurement wasn’t 
considered.  Analytical modeling wasn’t chosen due to its inaccuracy and the need for 
numerous assumptions.  Simulation is commonly used for network studies and was the 
most appropriate technique for this research.  The results obtained from this research 
were validated by both empirical data and analytical modeling.  The baseline was tested 
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against the empirical data obtained from the AFNOC to ensure that it is as close to 
accurate as possible.  Analytical modeling techniques were used to obtain the theoretical 
results of each of the tests to ensure the results from the simulation were similar. 
System Boundaries 
This section defines what comprises the system under test.  This section also 
defines the component under test as well as any research scope limitations.  The System 
Under Test (SUT) is the NIPRNET beginning with the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) border routers.  The system diagram is displayed in Figure 9 below.  The 
system consists of the six border routers, the trigger router, the twelve Air Force base 
routers, a web server at each of the twelve bases, and traffic generators at each of the 
twelve bases.  Only the BGP protocol is used to transmit packets from one router to 
another.  The border routers use BGP to send packets from the Internet to the base 
routers.  The base routers use BGP to send packets to the web servers.   
 
Figure 9 – System Diagram 
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A non-routing router is configured as the “trigger” router to remotely trigger the 
deployment of BGP black hole routing to the other six border routers.  The trigger router 
was configured to send the BGP black hole routing update after allowing the DDoS 
attack to last for ten seconds.  The ten seconds was chosen to simulate an IDS identifying 
a DDoS attack and sending the update to the trigger router within ten seconds.  The 
internet traffic, which includes DDoS traffic, is not a part of this system since it is 
introduced as part of the workload.  The key component under study for this research is 
BGP black hole routing.          
System Services 
The service this system provides is defense against a DDoS attack.  The border 
routers are the primary defensive system protecting the NIPRNET from the DDoS attack.  
The expected outcomes under increasingly severe attacks are that the routers will 
successfully drop all attack packets and forward all legitimate traffic, the routers will be 
partially degraded and drop some legitimate traffic while forwarding some of the attack 
packets, and finally the routers will cease forwarding any traffic, failing to prevent a 
DDoS attack. 
Workload 
The workload used to determine a baseline performance of the NIPRNET is based 
on data obtained from the Air Force Network Operations Center (AFNOC).  This data 
consists of the line speed of each base backbone and the percentage of bandwidth each 
base utilizes on average.  Using this data to establish a baseline allowed comparisons 
between normal NIPRNET operation and NIPRNET operations with additional 
workloads introduced.   
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The second workload introduced to the system was the baseline workload with an 
additional 12.8 Mbps of attack traffic from six attack systems to simulate a small DDoS 
attack.     
The next workload introduced consisted of a baseline workload with an additional 
38.4 Mbps of attack traffic from six attack systems to simulate a medium DDoS attack.     
The final workload consisted of the baseline workload and an additional 64 Mbps 
of attack traffic from six attack systems to simulate a large DDoS attack.     
Performance Metrics 
The performance metrics chosen for this research were queuing delay, latency, 
router convergence delay, bandwidth utilization, and packet drop rate (which was later 
dropped).  
The first performance metric is queuing delay.  Queuing delay is the time the 
router holds a packet for transmission before forwarding the packet through the network.  
The queuing delay is affected by the amount of traffic the router has to process.  The 
queuing delay measurement used for this research was the average delay of each packet 
over a two-minute time interval.    The router’s queuing delay measured the effect the 
DDoS attack had on the router’s capability to process packets.   
The second performance metric is latency.  Latency is the amount of time it takes 
packets to travel through the network.  Latency is measured on the communication 
channels between the bases and border routers and between the “trigger” router and the 
border routers.  The latency measurement used for this research was the average delay of 
each packet over a two-minute time interval.  The latency measurement was used to 
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determine how much slower traffic traversed the network due to the introduction of 
DDoS traffic.   
The third performance metric is router convergence delay.  Router convergence 
delay for this research was the amount of time it took the six border routers to update 
their routing tables with the black hole routing update.  Router convergence delay was 
measured on the pipes between the “trigger” router and the border routers.  The router 
convergence delay measurement used for this research was the average amount of time 
each of the border routers took to update their routing tables.  The router convergence 
delay measurement was used to determine how long it took to update the routing tables 
during a DDoS attack. 
Bandwidth utilization is a percentage of the network capacity being used.  It is 
measured on the pipes between the bases and the border routers.  This measurement 
revealed how much additional bandwidth the DDoS traffic is consuming.  It was also a 
good measurement to determine how much bandwidth the system can offer and still 
provide a good quality service. 
The packet drop rate is a ratio of the number of packets dropped within the 
network.  It was measured on the border routers.  During analysis of the data obtained for 
the first goal, it was determined that the packet drop rate did not add value to this 
research.  Due to the fact the border routers were suppose to be dropping attack packets, 
it was difficult to determine whether the packets dropped were actual attack packets or 
valid packets.  Therefore, the packet drop rate performance metric was not used for this 
research.   
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Parameters 
The parameters for this system include network bandwidth, router configuration, 
number of routers actively participating in BGP black hole routing during a DDoS attack, 
the number of routers handling DDoS traffic, length of simulation run, time at which 
border routers start dropping attack traffic, and length of DDoS attack.   
The bandwidth for each individual base pipe was assigned according to the data 
obtained from the AFNOC and varied between 9 and 50 Mbps per pipe.  The sizes of the 
two pipes that are attacked are 9 Mbps and 40 Mbps.  The pipes between border routers 
and on the internet were all assigned a bandwidth of 155 Mbps.  The reasoning behind 
using bandwidth as a system parameter was simple: sufficient amounts of bandwidth 
leads to an efficient system.  In addition, since this research was focused on the effects of 
the NIPRNET, the external pipes were assigned excessive bandwidth capabilities to 
prevent them from becoming the bottleneck in the system.  If the system didn’t have a 
sufficient amount of bandwidth, the baseline configuration would not perform 
adequately, thus the system would not be efficient to begin with.   
The router configuration has a major effect on the system performance as well.  If 
the router isn’t capable enough, it could become a bottleneck in the system.  The routers 
were configured to process 100,000 packets per second, which is adequate for a border 
router.  The queues for the routers had to be configured to only hold one second of data 
for each interface connected to a base.  This was due to the limitations of the system on 
which the simulations were run.   
The number of routers participating in BGP black hole routing will have an 
impact on how the system behaves.  With just one border router not defending against a 
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DDoS attack, the system should show an increase in bandwidth utilization.  The system 
may behave differently if a majority of the DDoS attack traffic is traversing through a 
portion of the routers as opposed to traversing uniformly through each of the routers.  
This research assumes that the DDoS attack traffic is distributed evenly amongst all of 
the border routers.   
Each simulation run lasted three minutes.  The border routers converged with 
each other within the first minute.  The attack traffic was introduced at the one minute 
mark and lasted for the final two minutes of the simulation.         
The system consists of an initial set of IP traffic to simulate bandwidth utilization 
and an additional set of IP traffic.  The workload parameters of this IP traffic that could 
affect the performance are the packet arrival rate, packet distribution, and packet size.  
The packet arrival rate was chosen because it affects queuing delays on the routers.  The 
packet arrival rate used for the baseline system was different for each base, due to each 
base having different bandwidth utilization quotas.  The empirical data obtained from the 
AFNOC determined the packet arrival rate for each base to ensure each base’s data was 
verified against the empirical data.  Packet distribution affects bandwidth utilization and 
latency throughout the system.  The packet distribution used for this research was a 
Poisson distribution.  Packet size was chosen because it affects queuing delays at the 
routers, as well as latency.  Due to the nature of DDoS attacks and how the packets can 
be different between different styles of attacks, the packet size parameters chosen for this 
research were exponential and 1024 bits.  The additional set of IP traffic is used to 
simulate a DDoS attack.  It consists of the same set of workload parameters as the initial 
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set of IP traffic and is chosen for the same reasons.  This set of IP traffic is essential in 
determining how well the system responds under a DDoS attack. 
Factors 
This research uses IP traffic offered load, the number of routers participating in 
BGP black hole routing, and the time set for the border routers to start dropping attack 
traffic as factors.   
The level of the IP traffic factors are six attack systems generating 12.8 Mbps of 
traffic by sending 2083 packets per second, six attack systems generating 38.4 Mbps of 
traffic by sending 6250 packets per second, and six attack systems generating 64 Mbps of 
traffic by sending 10417 packets per second.  The three attack scenarios were chosen to 
simulate 50, 150, and 250 attackers respectively with each attacker possessing a 256 
Kbps upload capability.  The reason for the six actual attack systems was to evenly 
distribute the attack traffic among the six border routers.  People who launch DDoS 
attacks do not know how much bandwidth the target system possesses.  They simply 
continue to increase the attack traffic until the service is unavailable.  By altering the 
additional traffic, this research demonstrates appropriately how effective BGP black hole 
routing is under different attack scenarios.     
Based on the pilot study discussed on the next page, the number of routers 
participating in BGP black hole routing is one, three, five and all.  The number of routers 
actively participating in BGP black hole routing is used to determine how effective BGP 
black hole routing defends against DDoS attacks when not all border routers are available 
for defense.  The number of routers was altered to simulate certain routers not receiving 
the routing table update through the network, thus not permitting them to defend.  The 
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system bandwidth utilization should increase proportionally to the number of routers not 
actively defending against the DDoS attack.  As the number of routers not defending 
increases, the queuing delay at the border routers not defending should also 
proportionally increase.  A pilot study was conducted to determine how many different 
values of routers should be used in this research.  The performance metrics obtained from 
the pilot study showed insignificant differences between the case of zero or one router, 
the case of two or three, and the case of four or five routers defending the network against 
a DDos attack.  The results of this pilot study were used to set the numbers of routers to 
one, three, and five.   
To achieve goals one and two of this research, the border routers were configured 
to start dropping attack traffic at the one minute mark of the simulation.  This was 
accomplished to ensure all of the attack traffic was being dropped from the beginning of 
the attack.  To achieve goals three and four, the trigger router was configured to send an 
update to the border routers at the 70 second mark of the simulation to simulate taking ten 
seconds to detect a DDoS attack.  Finally, to achieve goal five, the base router under 
attack was configured to send an update to the border router at the 70 second mark of the 
simulation to also simulate taking ten seconds to detect a DDoS attack. 
Experimental Design 
This research had a limited number of factors, but a full factorial design was not 
utilized due to the nature of the research.  The three factors, the number of routers 
involved in actively deploying black hole routing defensive measures, the amount of 
attack traffic introduced, and the time at which the border routers started dropping attack 
traffic, were included in the design of this research.  This research included an 
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experiment to establish the baseline system.  It was determined the system on which these 
simulations were to be run could not handle all of the traffic being explicit.  A pilot study 
had to be conducted to determine how much of the baseline traffic could be background 
traffic and still be able to obtain meaningful metrics.  The pilot study showed no 
significant difference in the performance metrics collected between 90 percent 
background traffic, 75 percent background traffic, 50 percent background traffic, and 10 
percent background traffic.  Therefore the baseline system was configured with 90 
percent being background traffic and 10 percent being explicit traffic to aid in the speed 
of the simulations.  The number of replications necessary to establish a baseline is five.  
The mean, standard deviation and variance is calculated for the bandwidth utilization, 
latency, and router queuing delay from these five runs.  A 90 percent confidence interval 
was then calculated for each of the three parameters.  The baseline was validated by 
ensuring the empirical data obtained from the AFNOC falls within the specified 90 
percent confidence interval.   
After establishing a valid baseline system, three experiments were run to simulate 
the small, medium, and large DDoS attack scenarios.  These experiments were run to 
determine if BGP black hole routing caused any unusual problems with respect to the 
performance metrics.  In addition, these experiments were used to determine if BGP 
black hole routing effectively defended the network from the three different attack 
scenarios.  In order to validate that these simulations were actually configured correctly, 
the packets received by the target under attack was verified to be zero.  There are 
currently no known external studies to which the data obtained from these simulations 
could be validated against. 
39 
The next 24 experiments tested the effectiveness of BGP black hole routing when 
one or more border routers didn’t participate in defending the network.  Six of these 
experiments were run to simulate five border routers actively black hole routing attack 
packets.  Three of these six were run to simulate the small, medium, and large DDoS 
attacks against a 9 Mbps pipe and the other three were run to simulate the three DDoS 
attacks against a 40 Mbps pipe.  The next six were run to simulate three border routers 
actively black hole routing attack packets.  Three of these simulated the small, medium, 
and large DDoS attacks attacking a 9 Mbps pipe and three simulated the three DDoS 
attacks against a 40 Mbps pipe.  Six were run to simulate one border router, other than 
the border router attached directly to the base under attack, actively black hole routing 
attack packets.  Three of these simulated the three DDoS attack scenarios against a 9 
Mbps pipe and the other three simulated the three DDoS attack scenarios against a 40 
Mbps pipe.  The final six were run to simulate the border router attached to the base 
under attack being the only router actively black hole routing attack packets.  Three of 
these simulated the three DDoS attack scenarios against a 9 Mbps pipe and three 
simulated the three DDoS attacks against a 40 Mbps pipe.  Once again to verify that these 
simulations were run correctly, the packets received by the system under attack was 
explored.  The simulation was verified as correct as long as the system under attack 
received the correct amount of packets.  There are no known existing studies with data 
that the data from these simulations could be validated against. 
Six additional experiments tested the effectiveness of remotely deploying BGP 
black hole routing after a network is already under a DDoS attack.  A bug was found in 
Opnet while setting up these experiments.  Opnet Modeler didn’t support the “tag” 
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attribute that is used by the trigger router.  A workaround was used: the route-map 
advertised by the trigger router matched on the IP address instead of a tag equal to 66.  
The border routers received a static route announcement from the trigger router and then 
received the route-map and since the IP address of the static route matched the IP address 
of the route-map the border routers updated their routing tables to drop any more traffic 
destined to that particular IP address.  Each of the six experiments simulated allowing the 
attack traffic to penetrate the network for ten seconds before the trigger router sent the 
update to the border routers.  Three experiments simulated a 9 Mbps pipe being attacked 
by the small, medium, and large DDoS attacks respectively and three experiments 
simulated a 40 Mbps pipe being attacked by the small, medium, and large DDoS attacks.  
The routing tables from each of the border routers and the packets received by the system 
under attack were looked at to determine if these simulations ran as expected.  These 
simulations were deemed verified as long as each border router had the routing update 
and the system under attack received no more packets after the update.  There are no 
known related studies to validate the data obtained by these simulations against.    
The final six experiments tested the effectiveness of deploying BGP black hole 
routing from the base router after a network is already under a DDoS attack.  The same 
workaround as discussed above was used in these six experiments.  Another problem was 
discovered while setting up these experiments.  BGP updates are sent via Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) packets.  In a study by Li Xiao, Guanghui He and Klara 
Nahrstedt from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, it was determined BGP 
failures occur in bandwidth-saturated networks [XHN05].  Since this scenario is dealing 
with DDoS attacks larger than the communication links under attack, a modification to 
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the border routers had to be made in order for the simulation to work.  Xiao, He, and 
Nahrstedt research proved by setting the backoff timer to 30 seconds and the maximum 
retransmission timeout (RTO) value to eight seconds on the routers that the BGP session 
was improved significantly [XHN05].  Therefore, the maximum RTO for this experiment 
was also set to eight seconds in order for the simulation to work.  Furthermore, to 
compare like results the maximum RTO was set to eight seconds to obtain the results for 
the remote-triggered BGP black hole routing experiments, discussed in the previous 
paragraph.  Each of the six experiments simulated allowing the attack traffic to penetrate 
the network for ten seconds before the base router sent the update to the border routers.  
The six experiments simulated the small, medium, and large DDoS attacks attacking the 
9 Mbps and 40 Mbps pipes, respectively.  These simulations were deemed verified as 
long as each border router had the routing update and the system under attack received no 
more packets after the update.  There are no known related studies to validate the data 
obtained by these simulations against. 
Each of these 39 experiments was replicated five times by using the same five 
seeds for the random number generator.  The mean, standard deviation and variance was 
obtained from each of the metrics of these 39 experiments to calculate a 90 percent 
confidence interval.  The data was validated once it was verified that four out of five runs 
possessed metric means within the specified 90 percent confidence interval.   
Analysis of Results 
Once all of the data was collected, it was analyzed to either support or disprove 
the hypotheses.  An analysis was conducted for each of the metrics.   
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To determine which metrics were better, comparisons between them were made.  
The queuing delay of the baseline routers was compared against the queuing delay of the 
routers under a DDoS attack.  The baseline data was used to derive a 90% confidence 
interval and by conducting a visual test it was determined if the queuing delay of the 
routers under attack were worse or not.  The performance metric is a Lower Better (LB) 
metric, which means the least amount of queuing delay the better.  The latency data from 
the baseline was compared to the latency data of the system under a DDoS attack.  Since 
the traffic had been validated and latency is a LB metric, a visual test was used to 
determine which was better.  The router convergence delay of each of the attack 
scenarios were compared to each other.  Again this metric is a LB metric; therefore a 
visual test was used to determine whether the convergence delay increased with the 
amount of attack traffic.  Bandwidth utilization of the baseline system was compared 
against the bandwidth utilization of the system under attack.  Once again, this is a LB 
metric and a visual test was used to determine which was better.   
The need to determine a confidence level is addressed next.  A 99% confidence 
interval (CI) would increase the validity of this research, but due to time constraints a 
lower confidence level was used.  With the number of tests conducted in this research, a 
90% confidence level was appropriate.   
Since lower confidence levels lead to an increased chance of the CI of two test 
results overlapping, there needed to be another approach to determining which metric 
was better.  In this research, additional replications were run in the case of overlapping 
confidence intervals. The data was then recalculated.  This process repeated itself until 
the confidence intervals did not overlap.    
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Summary 
This chapter followed a systematic approach to performance evaluation to define 
the problem to be solved, define the system, address the parameters and factors of the 
system, define the evaluation technique used, justify the experimental design, and to 
address how the analysis of the results will be handled.  A model of the NIPRNET 
established a baseline system to compare the results of 39 different experiments against.  
The goal of this research is to determine whether BGP black hole routing is an effective 
defense technique against DDoS attacks, to determine if a large network such as the 
NIPRNET suffers any adverse affects when using black hole routing, how much time is 
needed to restore border routers ACLs after a DDoS attack, how effective BGP black 
hole routing is when 1 or more border routers are not actively defending the network, and 
how successful a large network like the NIPRNET is in deploying black hole routing 
ACLs during a DDoS attack.  The factors used in the 39 experiments, the amount of 
DDoS traffic, the number of routers actively participating in black hole routing, and the 
time set for the routers to start dropping packets, varied between the experiments.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 explained the methodology used to conduct this research, so this 
chapter focuses on the results and analysis of this research.  To reiterate, the purpose of 
this thesis is to study the effects of BGP black hole routing on a network like the 
NIPRNET and to answer the following five questions:  
1)  Does BGP black hole routing have any adverse effects on the normal operation 
of a network like the NIPRNET? 
2)  Is BGP black hole routing effective in defending a network like the NIPRNET 
from DDoS attacks? 
3) Is BGP black hole routing effective when not all of the border routers are 
participating in the black hole routing? 
4)  Is remotely triggering BGP black hole routing effective on a network like the 
NIPRNET while it is under a DDoS attack? 
5)  Can customer-triggered BGP black hole routing be as effective as remote-
triggered black hole routing in defending a network under attack? 
Effectiveness of BGP black hole routing  
 BGP black hole routing does not have any adverse effects on the normal operation 
of a network like the NIPRNET and it does successfully defend a network like the 
NIPRNET.  To come to this conclusion the bandwidth utilization, router queuing delay, 
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and latency data are compared between the baseline system and the system being 
defended by BGP black hole routing against the three different DDoS attack scenarios.   
 The first metric to be discussed is bandwidth utilization.  Table 1 lists the 90 
percent confidence interval of the inbound bandwidth utilization along with the averages 
obtained from the baseline configuration and the three DDoS attack scenarios.  Table 2 
lists the 90 percent confidence interval of the outbound bandwidth utilization, as well as 
the averages obtained from the baseline configuration and the three DDoS attack 
scenarios. 
Table 1.  Inbound Utilization Statistics in Percentages 
Base
Inbound 
Utilization 90% 
Confidence 
Interval
Baseline 
Inbound 
Utilization 
Avg
12.8 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Inbound 
Utilization Avg
38.4 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Inbound 
Utilization Avg
64 Mbps DDoS 
Attack Inbound 
Utilization Avg
Beale (32.483, 32.589) 32.536 32.487 32.489 32.506
Vandenberg (59.149, 59.359) 59.254 59.280 59.293 59.351
Ellsworth (28.424, 28.532) 28.478 28.505 28.523 28.523
Whiteman (44.141, 44.326) 44.233 44.299 44.303 44.260
Hill (48.808, 49.009) 48.909 48.905 48.865 48.891
Mt Home (54.525, 54.703) 54.614 54.609 54.594 54.617
Goodfellow (41.002, 41.156) 41.079 41.079 41.070 41.076
Randolph (50.851, 51.050) 50.950 50.943 50.966 50.958
Moody (54.668, 54.852) 54.759 54.775 54.752 54.803
Robins (79.584, 79.811) 79.697 79.736 79.738 79.708
Little Rock (60.742, 60.988) 60.865 60.756 60.770 60.750
Tinker (64.682, 64.905) 64.793 64.800 64.799 64.791  
Table 2.  Outbound Utilization Statistics in Percentages 
Base
Outbound 
Utilization 90% 
Confidence 
Interval
Baseline 
Outbound 
Utilization 
Avg
12.8 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Outbound 
Utilization Avg
38.4 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Outbound 
Utilization Avg
64 Mbps DDoS 
Attack 
Outbound 
Utilization Avg
Beale (8.400, 8.443) 8.422 8.442 8.439 8.441
Vandenberg (14.663, 14.722) 14.692 14.672 14.671 14.686
Ellsworth (8.613, 8.655) 8.634 8.615 8.617 8.631
Whiteman (9.917, 9.960) 9.938 9.924 9.939 9.939
Hill (19.413, 19.471) 19.442 19.434 19.435 19.443
Mt Home (11.897, 11.949) 11.923 11.905 11.902 11.918
Goodfellow (9.081, 9.120) 9.100 9.090 9.087 9.112
Randolph (61.119, 61.285) 61.202 61.199 61.181 61.192
Moody (13.476, 13.529) 13.503 13.493 13.501 13.499
Robins (28.956, 29.021) 28.988 28.982 28.997 28.972
Little Rock (13.505, 13.561) 13.533 13.560 13.552 13.552
Tinker (16.567, 16.631) 16.599 16.607 16.604 16.625  
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The bandwidth utilization is compared by deriving a 90 percent confidence 
interval for each base inbound and outbound utilization level and conducting a visual 
analysis of the bandwidth utilization data.  Tables 1 and 2 illustrate that each of the base’s 
inbound and outbound utilization averages in each of the three attack scenarios are 
contained in the 90 percent confidence interval of the baseline system.  Therefore, it is 
concluded that no observable differences exists among the utilization levels of the three 
attack scenarios and the baseline utilization levels.  For that reason, this research verifies 
BGP black hole routing does not have an adverse effect on bandwidth utilization within a 
NIPRNET-like network.  In addition, this data proves that BGP black hole routing 
successfully defended the network bandwidth by not allowing any of the attack traffic to 
use available bandwidth. 
 The next metric to analyze is the queuing delay of the border routers.  The routers 
were configured to process 100,000 packets per second (pps) which is the service rate, µ.  
The arrival rate, λ, varied by base between 440 pps and 3785 pps for the baseline 
simulation and it increased on average by 1095 pps, 3425 pps, and 5912 pps for the 12.8 
Mbps, 38.4 Mbps, and 64 Mbps DDoS attacks respectively.  The gateway utilization ρ is 
equal to λ/µ.  The mean time spent in queue is equal to 1/µ(1 – ρ).  As λ gets larger in the 
case of the DDoS attacks ρ becomes larger and as ρ becomes larger the denominator of 
the mean time spent in queue becomes smaller, thus the queuing delay will increase.  
Figure 10 plots the relationship between the queuing delays of the six routers and the 
number of packets arriving at the six routers.  As displayed by the graph, the queuing 
delay of the routers increases with the increase in the number of packets the routers 
receive.   
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Figure 10 – Queuing Delay of all 4 Simulations 
As demonstrated by Figure 10, even though the queuing delay increases, the increase is in 
nanoseconds, which is minimal and doesn’t have a major impact on the overall 
performance of the network.  The raw data from the four scenarios is displayed in Table 3 
below.  As shown, the largest increase in queuing delay is 696 nanoseconds at Robins.   
Table 3.  Queuing Delay Averages in Microseconds 
Router
Queuing Delay 
90% Confidence 
Interval in 
Microseconds
Baseline 
Queuing 
Delay Avg
12.8 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Queuing Delay 
Avg
38.4 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Queuing Delay 
Avg
64 Mbps DDoS 
Attack 
Queuing Delay 
Avg
Beale (10.072, 10.075) 10.074 10.186 10.427 10.697
Denver (10.042, 10.045) 10.044 10.152 10.394 10.665
Hill (10.147, 10.150) 10.149 10.261 10.511 10.793
Kelly (10.222, 10.226) 10.224 10.341 10.607 10.896
Robins (10.391, 10.395) 10.393 10.520 10.784 11.089
Tinker (10.222, 10.225) 10.224 10.337 10.594 10.884  
The arrival rate was minimal in this research, but even if λ was increased to 99000 pps 
the queuing delay would be one millisecond, which is still a minimal increase to the 
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overall performance of the network.  As λ approaches µ, the queuing delay approaches 
infinity, but since border routers are configured to handle the maximum load capability of 
the communication links they are connected to, the λ would never reach µ.  Therefore, 
queuing delay would not have a major impact on the performance of the network.   This 
data definitely suggests that BGP black hole routing will not adversely affect the queuing 
delay of the border routers.  The only impact that BGP black hole routing has on the 
queuing delays of the border routers is related to the increase in attack traffic and not to 
the actual dropping of the packets.   
 The third and final metric to analyze is the latency of the packets traveling 
through the network.  Tables 4 and 5 below lists the 90 percent confidence intervals of 
the baseline inbound and outbound latency as well as the baseline inbound and outbound 
latency averages and the averages of the systems under the three different attack 
scenarios.  
Table 4.  Inbound Latency Averages in Milliseconds 
Base
Inbound Latency 
90% Confidence 
Interval
Baseline 
Inbound 
Latency 
Avg
12.8 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Inbound 
Latency Avg
38.4 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Inbound 
Latency Avg
64 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Inbound 
Latency Avg
Beale (137.956, 138.889) 138.422 137.966 138.306 137.973
Ellsworth (154.584, 154.918) 154.751 154.595 154.624 154.590
Goodfellow (117.217, 117.516) 117.366 117.494 117.493 117.513
Hill (113.020, 113.130) 113.075 113.087 113.059 113.109
Little Rock (142.733, 142.978) 142.856 142.892 142.923 142.797
Moody (120.720, 120.986) 120.853 120.727 120.745 120.758
Mt Home (158.923, 159.142) 159.032 159.091 158.965 159.094
Randolph (89.102, 89.231) 89.166 89.163 89.231 89.221
Robins (65.980, 66.078) 66.029 66.045 66.076 66.065
Tinker (90.988, 91.068) 91.028 91.034 91.003 90.996
Vandenberg (167.728, 167.969) 167.848 167.890 167.739 167.770
Whiteman (167.276, 167.633) 167.455 167.569 167.307 167.276  
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Table 5.  Outbound Latency Averages in Milliseconds 
Base
Outbound 
Latency 90% 
Confidence 
Interval
Baseline 
Outbound 
Latency 
Avg
12.8 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Outbound 
Latency Avg
38.4 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Outbound 
Latency Avg
64 Mbps 
DDoS Attack 
Outbound 
Latency Avg
Beale (102.194, 103.079) 102.636 102.195 102.302 102.258
Ellsworth (115.987, 115.992) 115.989 115.991 115.992 115.991
Goodfellow (85.174, 85.179) 85.176 85.176 85.176 85.179
Hill (98.019, 98.020) 98.019 98.019 98.020 98.020
Little Rock (108.212, 108.216) 108.214 108.216 108.214 108.216
Moody (93.287, 93.290) 93.289 93.289 93.290 93.290
Mt Home (131.809, 131.812) 131.811 131.811 131.810 131.811
Randolph (72.438, 72.439) 72.439 72.439 72.439 72.439
Robins (54.571, 54.573) 54.572 54.572 54.573 54.573
Tinker (80.485. 80.486) 80.485 80.486 80.486 80.486
Vandenberg (142.123, 142.125) 142.124 142.124 142.123 142.124
Whiteman (123.809, 123.813) 123.811 123.812 123.811 123.811  
As shown by the data in Tables 4 and 5, BGP black hole routing had no adverse 
effects on the inbound or outbound latency of the data being transmitted on the network.  
The 90% confidence intervals were derived from the data obtained from the baseline 
network.  It is apparent that the averages of each base in both the inbound and outbound 
latency averages are within the 90% confidence interval.  Therefore, with a 90 percent 
confidence level this research concludes there is no significant difference in the latency 
of the network due to BGP black hole routing.  The equality of the latency data also 
proves the network is successfully being defended by the black hole routing. 
Effectiveness of BGP black hole routing when not all of the border routers are 
participating in the black hole routing 
It seems obvious that BGP black hole routing wouldn’t be as effective when not 
all of the border routers are dropping attack traffic, but this research explores the 
possibilities and the results are presented in this section.  This section includes an 
analysis of the network being defended by one, three, and five border routers, in which 
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the border router directly connected to the base under attack is not black hole routing.  In 
addition, it also includes an analysis of the network defended only by the border router 
directly connected to the base under attack.  This section also studies the effects of the 
three DDoS attacks against two different bandwidth capabilities, which are 9 Mbps and 
40 Mbps.  The 9 Mbps communication channel belongs to Mt Home and its border router 
is Hill, while the 40 Mbps communication channel belongs to Randolph and its border 
router is Kelly.  This research reveals the differences in the inbound bandwidth 
utilization, queuing delay, and inbound latency.   
Inbound bandwidth utilization is the first metric to analyze.  Bandwidth utilization 
should decrease with an increase in the number of routers dropping attack packets.  It 
should also decrease when there are fewer attack packets being delivered into the 
network.  Table 6 below lists the utilization averages of the links. 
Table 6.  Bandwidth Utilization Averages 
Router
Attack 
Scenario
90% Confidence 
Interval of Fully 
Protected 
Network
Fully 
Protected 
Network
Network Defended 
by Border Router 
Connected to Base 
Under Attack
Network 
Defended 
by 5 
Routers
Network 
Defended by 
3 Routers
Network 
Defended by 
1 Router
Hill 12.8 Mbps (54.497, 54.721) 54.609 54.739 78.487 99.266 100.000
38.4 Mbps (54.501, 54.688) 54.594 54.658 99.287 100.000 100.000
64 Mbps (54.521, 54.712) 54.617 54.669 100.000 100.000 100.000
Kelly 12.8 Mbps (50.863, 51.023) 50.943 51.010 56.923 64.872 77.769
38.4 Mbps (50.868, 51.064) 50.966 51.022 68.128 91.682 99.840
64 Mbps (50.855, 51.060) 50.958 50.984 78.016 99.847 100.000  
Figures 11 through 16 plot the inbound bandwidth utilized for the communication links 
under the three different attack scenarios.  The remainder of the communication links 
within the network was not affected by the DDoS attacks. 
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Figure 11 – 9 Mbps Pipe Defended Against a 12.8 Mbps Attack 
 
Figure 12 – 40 Mbps Pipe Defended Against a 12.8 Mbps Attack 
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Figure 13 – 9 Mbps Pipe Defended Against a 38.4 Mbps Attack 
 
Figure 14 – 40 Mbps Pipe Defended Against a 38.4 Mbps Attack 
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Figure 15 – 9 Mbps Pipe Defended Against a 64 Mbps Attack 
 
 
Figure 16 – 40 Mbps Pipe Defended Against a 64 Mbps Attack 
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As illustrated by Figures 11 through 16, the inbound bandwidth utilization 
decreases as the number of routers dropping attack packets increases and the amount of 
attack traffic on the network decreases.  The one exception to that is when the border 
router connected to the base is the only router dropping attack packets, and in that case 
the border router is dropping all of the attack traffic, therefore the bandwidth utilization 
will not change.  This is only beneficial if it is known what border router is connected to 
the base under attack.  With the assumption the DDoS traffic is evenly distributed among 
all of the border routers, this research proves that the inbound bandwidth utilization will 
increase when one or more routers are not configured to drop the attack traffic, with the 
one exception mentioned.  It would be difficult to attempt to defend bandwidth utilization 
of the communication link under attack without having all of the border routers 
successfully dropping attack traffic. 
The second metric to discuss is queuing delay.  As discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter, the queuing delay of all the routers increases due to the increase in 
the amount of traffic being processed by the routers.  The amount of increase in the 
border routers not directly connected to the base router under attack is insignificant, as 
shown for the 64 Mbps attack in Table 7 below.   
Table 7.  Queuing Delay Averages in Microseconds 
Router
All 
Routers 
Defendin
g Against 
64 Mbps 
Attack
One Router 
Defending 
Against 64 
Mbps Attack 
Against 9 
Mbps Pipe
One Router 
Defending 
Against 64 
Mbps Attack 
Against 40 
Mbps Pipe
Base Border 
Router 
Defending 
Against 64 Mbps 
Attack Against 9 
Mbps Pipe
Base Border 
Router 
Defending 
Against 64 Mbps 
Attack Against 40 
Mbps Pipe
Three Routers 
Defending 
Against 64 
Mbps Attack 
Against 9 
Mbps Pipe
Three Routers 
Defending 
Against 64 
Mbps Attack 
Against 40 
Mbps Pipe
Five Routers 
Defending 
Against 64 
Mbps Attack 
Against 9 
Mbps Pipe
Five Routers 
Defending 
Against 64 
Mbps Attack 
Against 40 
Mbps Pipe
Beale 10.697 10.913 10.913 10.911 10.913 10.913 10.913 10.723 10.723
Denver 10.665 10.667 10.665 10.887 10.891 10.676 10.672 10.686 10.686
Hill 10.793 18.048 10.974 21.55 10.974 13.897 10.794 11.922 10.813
Kelly 10.896 11.074 18.625 11.074 22.287 10.901 14.108 10.917 12.104
Robins 11.089 11.183 11.181 11.182 11.179 11.183 11.186 11.097 11.098
Tinker 10.884 11.031 11.029 11.029 11.03 10.878 10.884 10.896 10.893  
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Table 7 illustrates that when a border router is not dropping attack packets, the queuing 
delay increases at most 216 nanoseconds, as in the case of the Beale router.  Beale’s 
queuing delay is 10.697 microseconds when it is configured to drop packets and the 
highest its queuing delay reaches is 10.913 microseconds when it is not configured to 
drop packets.  Since 216 nanoseconds is the worst case of increase, this section will focus 
on the border routers directly connected to the bases under attack.  Figures 17 and 18 plot 
the results of the network being attacked by the three different DDoS attack scenarios.  
As shown, the queuing delay is related to the number of routers protecting the network.  
Table 8 further demonstrates that even though the queuing delays decrease with fewer 
packets and more routers defending, the average queuing delays of the routers are worse.   
 
Figure 17 – Queuing Delay of Border Router Connected to 9 Mbps Pipe  
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Figure 18 – Queuing Delay of Border Router Connected to 40 Mbps Pipe 
Table 8.  Queuing Delay Averages of Routers in Microseconds 
Router
Attack 
Scenario
Queuing Delay 
90% Confidence 
Interval with 
Network Fully 
Protected
Queuing 
Delay with 
Network Fully 
Protected
Queuing 
Delay 
with 
Network 
Defended 
by 5 
Routers
Queuing 
Delay 
with 
Network 
Defended 
by 3 
Routers
Queuing 
Delay 
with 
Network 
only 
Defended 
by Denver 
Router
Queuing 
Delay with 
Network 
only 
Defended 
by Border 
Router 
Connected 
to Base
Hill 12.8 Mbps (10.259, 10.263) 10.261 10.276 10.633 10.961 11.014
38.4 Mbps (10.508, 10.605) 10.511 10.612 11.990 13.487 14.144
64 Mbps (10.790, 10.797) 10.793 10.973 13.897 18.048 21.550
Kelly 12.8 Mbps (10.339, 10.343) 10.341 10.363 10.726 11.078 11.111
38.4 Mbps (10.514, 10.609) 10.607 10.702 12.126 13.724 14.324
64 Mbps (10.893, 10.899) 10.896 11.076 14.108 18.625 22.287  
An interesting finding to note is that the router connected to the 9 Mbps pipe consistently 
has a lower queuing delay than the router connected to the 40 Mbps pipe.  The reason for 
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this is the router’s queues had to be configured to only hold one second of traffic to allow 
the simulations to run due to memory constraints of the system on which the simulations 
were run.  Therefore, the router connected to the 9 Mbps pipe dropped more overall 
traffic due to a smaller queue and thus resulting in a shorter queuing delay for packets it 
actually processed.  As stated in chapter 3, it was not feasible to determine which packets 
were valid and which were attack traffic, therefore packets dropped were not measured as 
a metric for this research.  As stated in the previous section, the queuing delay of the 
routers is affected by the amount of attack traffic on the network.  This research also 
demonstrates that queuing delay is also affected by the number of routers dropping attack 
traffic.  Even with the border router connected to the base under attack being the only 
router dropping attack traffic, the queuing delay is increased due to the fact it has to drop 
all of the attack traffic.  Therefore, this data clarifies the obvious that a reduction in the 
number of routers dropping attack packets does result in an insignificant increase of the 
queuing delay at the border router connected to the base under attack.  In addition, as 
stated in the previous section, the queuing delay of the border routers shouldn’t have a 
major impact on the performance of the network due to the robustness of the routers.   
 The last metric to analyze is the inbound latency of the communication links 
under attack.  The latency of the other communication links within the network shows no 
significant difference from the baseline system.  The inbound delay of the bases under 
attack should increase with each increase in attack traffic being allowed to pass through 
the network.  Figures 19 and 20 plot the latency data obtained in this research.  Latency is 
determined by propagation, transmit, and queue.  Propagation is defined as the distance 
traveled by the speed of light.  In this simulation, the propagation will not change due to 
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the increase in attack traffic, so propagation was disregarded as a reason for an increase 
in latency.  Transmit is defined by the size of the packet divided by the bandwidth.  
Therefore, transmit did not change in this research either.    
 
Figure 19 – Inbound Latency of Base with 9 Mbps Pipe  
 
Figure 20 – Inbound Latency of Base with 40 Mbps Pipe  
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The only logical explanation for an increase in latency is due to an increase in queuing 
delay.  As shown previously in this section, the queuing delay of the routers was only 
increased by microseconds.  A more thorough look revealed that the increase in latency 
was caused by the communication link being saturated.  Table 9 lists the amount of 
milliseconds that were added to the latency under each scenario due to the 
communication link’s queue.   
Table 9.  Average Added Queuing Delay of Communication Link in Milliseconds 
Router
Attack 
Scenario
Hill with 
Protection 
by Hill 
Only 
Kelly with 
Protection 
by Kelly 
Only 
Hill with 
Protection 
by Denver 
Only
Kelly with 
Protection 
by Denver 
Only
Hill with 
Protection 
by 
Denver, 
Kelly, and 
Tinker
Kelly with 
Protection 
by 
Denver, 
Hill, and 
Tinker
Hill with 
Protection 
by every 
Router 
except 
Hill
Kelly with 
Protection 
by every 
Router 
except 
Kelly
Hill with 
Full 
Protection 
Kelly with 
Full 
Protection 
Hill 12.8 Mbps 0.008 67.843 0.974 0.063 0.008
38.4 Mbps 0.008 78.003 73.463 1.017 0.008
64 Mbps 0.008 81.185 78.611 70.395 0.008
Kelly 12.8 Mbps 0.002 0.019 0.011 0.004 0.002
38.4 Mbps 0.002 1.061 0.049 0.011 0.002
64 Mbps 0.002 15.955 1.097 0.020 0.002  
As shown by the above figures, the inbound latency is related to the number of routers 
protecting the network, the amount of attack traffic on the network, and the bandwidth 
utilization of the base under attack.  The inbound latency of the network with only the 
border router connected to the base under attack is the same as the network when all six 
routers are dropping attack traffic.  This is due to the fact that the border router is 
dropping all of the attack traffic and thus not overloading the link’s queue.  Therefore, by 
knowing which border router the system under attack is connected to it is feasible to drop 
the attack traffic at that border router only and the inbound latency will not be affected.  
The data also suggests that if you know the exact amount of bandwidth available on a 
communication link and the exact amount of attack traffic coming inbound, that you 
could possibly configure the network to only have a portion of the routers dropping attack 
60 
packets and the inbound latency would not be affected.  The data more strongly suggests, 
it is wiser to ensure every border router drops attack packets to ensure inbound latency is 
minimally affected. 
Effectiveness of remotely triggering BGP black hole routing on a network like the 
NIPRNET while it is under a DDoS attack 
To determine the feasibility of remotely triggering border routers after an attack 
has started, this research looks at the amount of time it takes the border routers to 
converge with the update sent from the trigger router to start dropping attack traffic.  This 
research also looks at how fast the network recovers once the BGP black hole routing has 
been triggered, by looking at the bandwidth utilization, router queuing delay, and latency 
data.   
As stated in Chapter 3, these simulations were configured to simulate the attack 
traffic attacking the network for ten seconds before the trigger router sent the update to 
start dropping the attack traffic.  Figure 21 illustrates the router convergence data 
obtained.  The data illustrates that each of the border routers has been updated to start 
dropping packets in no more time than 32 milliseconds.  The data obtained during this 
research also supports that each border router is dropping attack traffic by 200 
milliseconds after the update is sent by the trigger router.  The data also shows that the 
routers will take longer to apply the updates with an increase in attack traffic.  A 38.4 
Mbps attack against a 9 Mbps communication link increases the router’s convergence by 
an average of 73 microseconds over a 12.8 Mbps attack, whereas a 38.4 Mbps attack 
against a 40 Mbps communication link increases the router’s convergence by an average 
of 37 microseconds over a 12.8 Mbps attack.   
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Figure 21 – Remote Triggered Update Router Convergence 
In addition, a 64 Mbps attack against a 9 Mbps communication link increases the router’s 
convergence by an average of 52 microseconds over a 38.4 Mbps attack, whereas a 64 
Mbps attack against a 40 Mbps communication link increases the router’s convergence 
by an average of 90 microseconds over a 38.4 Mbps attack.  The data implies that on 
average the routers will take an additional 2 microseconds to converge with each 
additional 1 Mbps of attack traffic introduced into the network.   
The next area to look at is bandwidth utilization.  Figures 22 and 23 illustrate how 
the utilization of the two attacked bases reacts to the attack and to the black hole routing.  
As shown in the graphs, the utilization rates of the two communication links return to 
normal around the 200 millisecond point, which is consistent with the router convergence 
data.  Therefore, remotely triggering the border routers defended the networks bandwidth 
in less than one second. 
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Figure 22 – Inbound Bandwidth Utilization of 9 Mbps Pipe 
 
Figure 23 – Inbound Bandwidth Utilization of 40 Mbps Pipe 
The next metric to explore is the queuing delay of the border routers.  Figures 24 
and 25 illustrate the data obtained from this research.  As expected, the router queuing 
delays return to normal within 200 milliseconds of the black hole routing update.  This 
data demonstrates that remotely triggering BGP black hole routing does successfully 
protect the border routers’ queuing delays. 
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Figure 24 – Router Queuing Delay of 9 Mbps Pipe 
 
Figure 25 – Router Queuing Delay of 40 Mbps Pipe 
 The final metric to examine is the latency of the network.  Figures 26 and 27 
below graph the inbound latency results obtained.  Outbound latency was not affected 
during these simulations.  The data shows that the latency of the network is restored to 
normal within the 200 milliseconds of the remote-triggered update, once again suggesting 
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that remote-triggered black hole routing is successful in protecting latency within a 
network in a minimal amount of time.   
 
Figure 26 – Inbound Latency of 9 Mbps Pipe 
 
Figure 27 – Inbound Latency of 40 Mbps Pipe 
 This data presented in this section suggests that remotely triggering border routers 
to black hole attack traffic during a DDoS attack would be highly successful.  The large 
Internet communication links are key to ensuring the updates are delivered in a small 
amount of time and the network is restored in a reasonable time. 
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Effectiveness of customer-triggered BGP black hole routing as compared to remote-
triggered black hole routing in defending a network under attack 
 The scenario for testing this goal is to set up the network as in the previous 
section.  The attack traffic is allowed to freely flow through the network for ten seconds 
before the base router attempts to send an update to the border router it is connected to 
start dropping attack packets.  With customer-triggered black hole routing, the updating 
of the base router would either have to be a manual process or there would have to be an 
intrusion detection system connected to the router that would need to be able to update 
the base router policies via some sort of batch script.  In the case of a manual update, ten 
seconds to detect a DDoS attack and to update the router to send the update to the border 
router would be rather quick.  In the case of an automated update, ten seconds would 
border on the slow side.  Since customer-triggered black hole routing could be 
accomplished in either fashion, ten seconds was chosen to compare the results from this 
scenario to the scenario from the previous section.  This research looks at the router 
convergence times, as well as how fast the network recovers once the BGP black hole 
routing has been triggered. 
The convergence time of the border routers is determined by the amount of attack 
traffic, size of the routers queue, the communication link’s delay, and the bandwidth of 
the communication link.  Figure 28 below displays the results obtained from this 
research.  As you can see, the 40 Mbps communication link gets the updates to the border 
routers rather quickly under the 12.8 and 38.4 Mbps attacks.   
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Figure 28 - Customer Triggered Update Router Convergence 
The reason for this is due to the fact that the border router connected to the 40 Mbps 
communication link has a larger queue size as described in Chapter 3, the bandwidth 
available is 40 Mbps, and the delay on the link is 65 milliseconds (ms).  Taking all of 
these factors into consideration, the probability that the BGP TCP packets will be 
dropped and have to be retransmitted is 0 percent for the 12.8 Mbps attack and 7 percent 
for the 38.4 Mbps attack.  In contrast, for the 9 Mbps communication link under attack, 
the border router connected to it has a much smaller queue size, an available bandwidth 
of only 9 Mbps, and a delay of 126 ms.  Therefore the probability the BGP TCP packets 
will be dropped is 34 percent for the 12.8 Mbps attack and 54 percent for the 38.4 Mbps 
attack.  As for the 64 Mbps attack, the probability the BGP TCP packets will be dropped 
is 21 percent for the 40 Mbps communication link and 75 percent for the 9 Mbps 
communication link.  These probabilities were obtained from the queuing data obtained 
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during this simulation.  Therefore, in order for customer-triggered black hole routing to 
be effective, it would have to be triggered on a link with the necessary bandwidth and 
minimal delay as well as a router with a large enough queue to handle the amount of 
attack traffic on the network.  It is interesting to point out that in each of the 64 Mbps 
scenarios, the border routers attached to the communication link under attack received the 
update from the base but took extra time to send the update to the other five routers.  It is 
speculated that this phenomenon is attributed to the fact that the BGP updates are sent via 
TCP and the border routers attached to the bases under attack were still dropping packets 
due to their queue sizes.  Therefore, it took longer for them to complete the TCP three-
way handshake with the remaining border routers. 
 As for how the network responded, the first metric explored is bandwidth 
utilization.  Figures 29 and 30 display the inbound bandwidth utilization data obtained. 
 
Figure 29 – Inbound Bandwidth Utilization of 9 Mbps Pipe 
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Figure 30 – Inbound Bandwidth Utilization of 40 Mbps Pipe 
The data shows that the utilization returns to normal after the successful triggering of the 
black hole routing.  Unfortunately, the bandwidth is consumed for an amount of time that 
is directly related to the amount of time it takes the border routers to receive the update 
from the base and to converge.   
 The next metric to examine is the queuing delay of the border routers.  Figures 31 
and 32 below graph the results.  As demonstrated, the queuing delay of the border routers 
 
Figure 31 – Router Queuing Delay of 9 Mbps Pipe 
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Figure 32 – Router Queuing Delay of 40 Mbps Pipe 
is greatly impacted by the 64 Mbps attack.  It elevates the queuing delay from 
microseconds to seconds.  This is a major impact to a network that is constructed to meet 
certain delay averages.  A network like the NIPRNET would definitely be impacted if its 
router’s queuing delays were elevated into seconds.   
 The final metric is latency.  Figures 33 and 34 below graph the results obtained. 
 
Figure 33 – Inbound Latency of 9 Mbps Pipe 
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Figure 34 – Inbound Latency of 40 Mbps Pipe 
Once again, the network is highly affected by the 64 Mbps attack.  The 64 Mbps attack 
also affects the outbound latency as illustrated in Figures 35 and 36 below.   
 
Figure 35 – Outbound Latency of 9 Mbps Pipe under 64 Mbps Attack 
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Figure 36 – Outbound Latency of 40 Mbps Pipe under 64 Mbps Attack 
Most of the latency data can be attributed to the fact that the router’s queuing delays were 
elevated into the seconds.  There is a direct correlation between the outbound latency data 
and the router’s queuing delay data.  These latency results would definitely be 
unacceptable on a network like the NIPRNET. 
 This section suggests that customer-triggered BGP black hole routing isn’t as 
effective as remotely triggering border routers via more robust communication links.  
Since BGP uses TCP packets to communicate and pass updates, the links between the 
bases and the border routers don’t seem to be large enough to successfully automate the 
triggering of the border routers to start black hole routing attack traffic.    
Summary 
The evaluation and analysis of the goals proposed in Chapter 3 was accomplished 
in this chapter.  The model output data was analyzed to assist in providing answers to the 
questions posed by the goals.  Some of the questions have distinctive yes or no answers, 
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while others do not, based on the factors presented in this chapter.  Finally, this analysis 
process demonstrates its merit in aiding decision-makers in determining solutions which 
best meet a defined set of criteria.  With the active participation of the NSA and 
educational institutions, this process can be iterated, allowing for tradeoff analysis 
studies. 
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V.  Conclusions 
Goal Restatement 
The goal of this thesis was to evaluate BGP black hole routing on a network like 
the NIPRNET.   The thesis was to look at whether BGP black hole routing had any 
adverse effects on the network, whether it was effective in defending the network from a 
DDoS attack, whether it was effective in defending a network when not all of the routers 
were black holing the DDoS traffic, how effective was remotely triggering the border 
routers to black hole when the network was already under attack, and to determine if 
customer triggered black hole routing was as effective as remote triggered black hole 
routing.  Assumptions were made where network data was not available. 
Conclusions 
A computer systems analysis approach was used to analyze the abilities of BGP 
black hole routing under the scenarios presented by the goals.  These systems were 
evaluated in terms of router queuing delays, latency, bandwidth utilization, and router 
convergence delays.  The following five questions were answered: 
1)  Does BGP black hole routing have any adverse effects on the normal operation of a 
network like the NIPRNET? 
A network like the NIPRNET displayed no adverse effects due to BGP 
black hole routing.  It was pointed out in Chapter 4 that the queuing delays of the 
border routers did increase when the network was under attack, but this was 
attributed to the increase in the amount of traffic on the network.     
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2)  Is BGP black hole routing effective in defending a network like the NIPRNET from 
DDoS attacks? 
BGP black hole routing proved to be successful in defending a network 
like the NIPRNET against DDoS attacks.   
3) Is BGP black hole routing effective when not all of the border routers are participating 
in the black hole routing? 
The results were mixed.  As for queuing delay, it increases minimally.  
Therefore, the queuing delay is impacted when not all routers are dropping attack 
traffic, but unless the DDoS attack is in the multitude of billions of bits per 
second, the queuing delay will not have an adverse affect on normal operations of 
a network like the NIPRNET.  Latency and bandwidth utilization increase as well, 
except in the case where the border router connected to the base under attack is 
the only router dropping packets.  It was proven that latency is affected by the 
queuing delay of the communication link and if the link is 100 percent utilized it 
will increase the latency of the packets.  It was also demonstrated that defending 
bandwidth utilization will definitely be problematic without using all of the 
border routers to drop attack traffic.  It is feasible to only drop packets by the 
border router directly connected to the base under attack, but it isn’t optimal for 
the network.   
4) Is remotely triggering BGP black hole routing effective on a network like the 
NIPRNET while it is under a DDoS attack? 
Remotely triggering BGP black hole routing is highly effective as long as 
it is conducted over robust communication links.  In each scenario the border  
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routers were dropping attack traffic in less than 200 milliseconds. 
5)  Can customer-triggered BGP black hole routing be as effective as remote-triggered 
black hole routing in defending a network under attack? 
Customer-triggered black hole routing is clearly not as effective as 
remote-triggered black hole routing.  This is due to BGP updates being sent via 
TCP packets and the communication links between the bases and border routers 
not being of sufficient size to handle the same amount of traffic as the 
communication links between the border routers.  The study revealed that it could 
take nearly 50 seconds to propagate the update throughout the network and that is 
definitely not sufficient in terms of defending a network like the NIPRNET.   
Contributions 
AFIT is now an integral part of the National Security Agencies (NSA) research 
into BGP black hole routing.  This research lays the foundation and framework for all 
future AFIT work regarding BGP black hole routing.  More importantly, this study gives 
the NSA a baseline from which to work regarding their ongoing efforts to defend the 
NIPRNET from DDoS attacks.  This research proves that BGP black hole routing can 
successfully be deployed on the NIPRNET to defend against DDoS attacks.  It 
demonstrates that due to the nature of BGP updates, remote-triggered black hole routing 
is more effective than customer-triggered black hole routing.  Finally, this thesis has 
reinforced AFIT’s partnership with the NSA by once again demonstrating AFIT’s ability 
to solve complex operational problems.   
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Suggestions for Future Work 
This research effort only scratched the surface of possibilities with respect to BGP 
black hole routing.  This research only looked at destination-based black hole routing; 
source-based black hole routing is one area that would expand on this research.  In 
addition, this research simulated the remote triggering and customer triggering of black 
hole routing.  This research would be expanded by configuring an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) in Opnet to actually detect a DDoS attack and send out the BGP update to 
each of the border routers.  In addition, many simplifying assumptions were necessary 
due to limitations with the simulation software.  It would greatly expand this research if 
an actual scaled down NIPRNET were put in place throughout the United States to obtain 
some empirical data.   
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Appendix A:  Model Configurations 
 
 
Figure 37 – Internal Internet Set-up 
 
Figure 38 – Internal Base Set-up 
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Figure 39 – Border Router BGP Parameters 
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Figure 40 – Border Router BGP Neighbor Information 
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Figure 41 – Border Router IP Routing Parameters 
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Figure 42 – Border Router IP Processing Information 
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Figure 43 – Border Router IP Quality of Service Configuration of 9 Mbps Pipe 
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Figure 44 – Border Router IP Tunnel Information 
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Figure 45 – Border Router to Internet Link Configuration 
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Figure 46 – Border Router to Base Link Configuration 
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Figure 47 – TCP Settings on All Routers 
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Figure 48 – Border Router Route Map Configuration 
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Figure 49 – Border Router Static Routing Table 
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Figure 50 – Trigger-Router Route Map Configuration 
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Figure 51 – Trigger-Router Static Routing Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
Bibliography 
 
[BEN00] Bennett, T., “Distributed Denial of Service Attacks”, http://www.linuxsecurity 
.com /resource_files/intrusion_detection/ddos-faq.html, February 2000. 
 
[CIS96] “OSPF Design Guide”, http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/104/2.html, 1996. 
 
[CIS03] “Cisco Internetworking Technology Handbook, Chapter 39 – Border Gateway 
Protocol”, http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito_doc/bgp.pdf, 1992-
2003. 
 
[CIS04] “Black-Hole Filtering Minimizes Impact of Server Attacks”, http://www.cisco 
.com/warp/public/779/servpro/promotions/bbip/pdfs/bbip_v5.06.pdf, March 2004. 
 
[DAT04] Data Connection, “RIP: Routing Information Protocol”, 
http://www.dataconnection.com/iprouting/ripprotocol.htm, 1998-2004 
 
[GRE02] Greene, B., “Remote Triggered Black Hole Filtering-02”, ftp://ftp-
eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/essentials/, August 2002. 
 
[KAL00] Kalyanaraman, S., “Exterior Gateway Protocols: EGP, BGP-4, CIDR”, 
http://www.ecse.rpi.edu/Homepages/shivkuma/teaching/sp2000/i12_egp/, March 2000. 
 
[MMR00] Mirkovic, J., J. Martin, and P. Reiher, “A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and 
DDoS Defense Mechanisms”, http://lasr.cs.ucla.edu/ddos/ucla_tech_report_020018.pdf, 
2000. 
 
[MOR04] Battle, T., D. McPherson, and C. Morrow, “Customer-Triggered Real-Time 
Blackholes”, http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0402/pdf/morrow.pdf, February 2004. 
 
[RAJ02] Rajnovic, D., “Black Hole Routers”, http://www.terena.nl/tech/task-forces/tf-
csirt/meeting7/rajnovic-black-hole-routers.pdf, September 2002. 
 
[RIV04] Riverhead Networks Whitepaper, “Defeating DDoS Attacks”, http://angell.com 
/portfolio/Riverhead_WP.pdf, 2004. 
 
[SAS99] “Dijkstra Algorithm”, 
http://www.cs.usask.ca/resources/tutorials/csconcepts/1999_8/tutorial/advanced/dijkstra/
dijk_descrip.html, 1999 
 
[SEC03] “Autonomic Systems – Combating DDoS Attacks”, http://www.securesynergy 
.com/library/articles/037-2003.php, March 2003. 
 
[UCD03] “EEC 189Q: Introduction to Communication Networks”, http://www.ece. 
ucdavis .edu/~chuah/classes/eec189q/lectures/L7_globalinternet.pdf, October 2003. 
92 
 
[XHN05] “Understanding BGP Session Robustness in Bandwidth Saturation Regime”, 
http://cairo.cs.uiuc.edu/~lixiao/application/CV_lixiao.pdf, 2005 
 
[ZAR03] Zaroo, P., “A Survey of DDoS attacks and some DDoS defense  
mechanisms”, http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/zaroo/papers/my_papers/ddos_paper.pdf, 
June 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of 
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 
1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty 
for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
21-03-2005 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis     
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Aug 2003 – Mar 2005 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
Analysis of Effects of BGP Black Hole Routing on a Network like the NIPRNET 
   
 5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Kleffman, Michael D., Captain, USAF 
 
 
 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
     Air Force Institute of Technology 
    Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
     WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GIA/ENG/05-01 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
  Mr. Neal Ziring  
     NSA/I33 
     Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000      
                                                                         Phone: 410-854-5762 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
              APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
14. ABSTRACT  
     The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) to 
exchange information freely between departments, services, bases, posts, and ships.  The NIPRNET is vulnerable to various 
attacks, to include physical and cyber attacks.  One of the most frequently used cyber attacks by criminally motivated hackers 
is a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.  DDoS attacks can be used to exhaust network bandwidth and router 
processing capabilities, and as a leveraging tool for extortion.  Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) black hole routing is a 
responsive defensive network technique for mitigating DDoS attacks.  BGP black hole routing directs traffic destined to an 
Internet address under attack to a null address, essentially stopping the DDoS attack by dropping all traffic to the targeted 
system.  
     This research examines the ability of BGP black hole routing to effectively defend a network like the NIPRNET from a 
DDoS attack, as well as examining two different techniques for triggering BGP black hole routing during a DDoS attack.  This 
thesis presents experiments with three different DDoS attack scenarios to determine the effectiveness of BGP black hole 
routing.  Remote-triggered black hole routing is then compared against customer-triggered black hole routing to examine how 
well each technique reacts under a DDoS attack.  The results from this study show BGP black hole routing to be highly 
successful.    It also shows that remote-triggered black hole routing is much more effective than customer-triggered. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
  
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Graham, Robert P. Jr, USAF, AFIT/ENG 
REPORT 
U 
ABSTRACT 
U 
c. THIS PAGE 
U 
17. LIMITATION OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
107 19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (937) 255-3636, ext 4715; e-mail:  Robert.graham@afit.edu 
Standard Form 298 (Rev: 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
